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Abstract. This paper discusses the aspects of data reliability and user privacy for the emerging practice of mobile phone based contact
tracing for the COVID-19 pandemic. Various countries and large technology companies have already used or plan to design and use
mobile phone based solutions, in an effort to urgently expedite the process of identifying people who may have been exposed to the
disease and limit its spread to the general population. However, serious concerns have been raised both in terms of the validity of the
collected data as well as the extent to which implemented approaches can breach the privacy of the mobile phone users. This review
examines  the  weaknesses  of  existing  implementations  and  concludes  with  specific  recommendations  that  can  contribute  towards
increasing the safety of infrastructures that collect and process this kind of information, as well as the adoption and acceptance of these
solutions from the public.
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1 Introduction
On March 11th 2020, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak of COVID-19 a
global pandemic [1]. Emergency measures have fundamentally altered the economy and society on a global scale, as health
systems around the world struggled to keep up with the demand for emergency health care [2]. As part of these measures
and in an attempt to quickly identify people who may have been exposed to the disease and thus limit its spread to the
general  population, many governments around the world have deployed mobile phone applications to make the public
health process of contact tracing more efficient in a massive scale. A non exhaustive list of countries that were among the
first to deploy mobile phone based contract tracing applications include Australia [3], China [4], Israel [5], Norway [6],
Singapore [7] and South Korea [8]. In addition, large technology companies such as Google and Apple are preparing their
own infrastructure for COVID-19 contact tracing [9]. 
Many  of  the  previously  mentioned  governments  that  were  early  adopters  of  the  technology  and  make  the
participation of its citizens in electronic contract tracing voluntary have claimed that their applications are safe to use and
prompted their citizens to download and use them. However, many technology experts have criticized the technology [10]
or expressed concern about its efficacy versus its privacy implications [11]. Moreover, in certain countries, public response
to the technology was lukewarm. For instance, India, Singapore and Norway have seen limited user acceptance of these
solutions if one examines recently estimated application download numbers [12].  All these facts give merit to a closer
examination of the problems of COVID-19 contact tracing solutions.
Before taking a closer look into the problems of contact  tracing solutions,  it  is  necessary to provide essential
definitions about the concept and the technologies involved in making the transition from manual to electronic procedures. 
In public health epidemiological context, contact tracing is the process of identifying persons who may have come
into contact with a person whose infection has been confirmed [13]. The infected person is often referred to as the “index
case” and all the people that have come into contact that meets certain criteria (proximity, type of transmission, duration)
with the index case are referred to as the “contacts”. The systemic collection of further information about these contacts
aims to isolate them, test them for the infection and treat them where applicable. Depending on the type and expected spread
of an outbreak, the process can be recursively repeated for contacts of contacts. The overall aim is to limit the spread of the
infection in the general population.
Health authorities follow specific protocols that require manual contact tracing. This means that health workers
evaluate the provided information, search for locating the contacts, notify the contacts (phone call) and all this depends on
the accuracy of the information that the index case and his/her subsequent contacts can provide. It is thus reasonable to
assume that  as health infrastructures are strained for resources in a fast spreading infection, the quality as well  as the
accuracy of manual contact tracing procedure will suffer. This has been confirmed well before the COVID-19 outbreak. In
fact, electronic contact tracing has been tested in the pre-COVID-19 world in many epidemiological emergencies, among
them the Ebola virus outbreak [14]. Although this study is far from the technology implementation aspects we see in the
COVID-19 mobile phone contact tracing solutions, it highlighted the power of the ubiquity of the mobile phone as a tool to
aid the monitoring and spread of infectious diseases.
In a post-COVID-19 world, governments and technology companies turn to various aspects of mobile  and general
computing infrastructures to implement contact tracing solutions. In particular, most COVID-19 contact tracing solutions
make use of the following mobile phone technologies:
A) The use of Global Positioning System and Assisted GPS (A-GPS) [15] technology: Every mobile phone has an
embedded GPS receiver  and  through to complimentary components  of  a  3GPP compliant  [16,17]  telecommunications
infrastructure, a time series of GPS coordinates of the mobile device can be recorded. Features like the Google Account
Location history [18], as well as the Chinese [4], Israeli [5] and Norwegian [6] contact tracing applications make use of the
position/location data. Google has also used location data during the COVID-19 pandemic to estimate the extent of the
imposed quarantine measures in various countries with the so called ‘mobility reports’ [19].
B) The use of the Bluetooth protocol [20]: The Bluetooth protocol is a complex wireless technology standard that
encompasses different modes of transmission and functionality. The relevant bits to contact tracing concern its low energy
variant called Bluetooth LE [21]. This variant is used to perform proximity sensing calculations. The calculations are used
to estimate the distance between the index case and the contacts and thus play a crucial role in most  COVID-19 contact
tracing application implementations. Another crucial aspect that concerns the Bluetooth operation is that the technology is
used to exchange data between devices. Latter paragraphs will describe that process in more detail.
C) The increase in power and data storage in mobile phones, as well as the ubiquity of reliable 3G/4G (and in the
near future 5G) connections create powerful ways of constructing big data sets with different levels of anonymity and
susceptibility to linkage attacks [22]. Most of the solutions claim that they take precautions to anonymize the data they
exchange. Data exchange and collection can also occur in de-centralized or centralized ways. This has different implications
for the privacy of the users that contribute the data in question. 
Leaving the substantial variations among existing different COVID-19 contact tracing implementations to the side,
in simple terms, when a user downloads a contact tracing application to a smartphone, the device will in principle perform
the following actions:
A)Activate the Bluetooth LE interface and will broadcast its presence by means of transmitting an anonymous
identifier. The transmission of the identifier is performed repeatedly in the form of a beacon. 
B)Use the same Bluetooth LE interface to record received anonymous identifiers of other mobile phones within
range.
C)For  every  received/intercepted  anonymous  Bluetooth  LE  identifier,  the  phone  will  attempt  to  estimate  its
proximity. This proximity sensing step is crucial to the validity of the sampled data. 
D)The collected data are stored in the smartphone but are handled in different ways. An abstraction of such a
record could look like the ones below:
r:time,date,BLE_id,proximity_estimation,covid19_flag
OR
r:time,date,BLE_id,proximity_estimation,A_GPS_data,covid19_flag
where BLE_ID is the anonymous identifier, proximity_estimation represents a distance (meters) , A_GPS_data represent
location data of the smartphone according to the data collected by its A-GPS receiver and finally covid19_flag represents
whether the user of the smartphone has disclosed (voluntarily) whether he is infected with  COVID-19. Different contact
tracing implementations upload these records (with the user’s consent) to different types of central database infrastructures
for processing.  
For the purposes of clarity, we need to emphasize not all mobile application implementations collect GPS data
(A_GPS_data field). The collection of location data creates privacy concerns that are discussed in Section 3 of this paper.
The A_GPS_data field can collect other forms of location data (Cell tower ID) to aid the accuracy of the proximity sensing
process in various ways.  
A central  database  will  process  the  collected  records  with  particular  emphasis  on  the  records  that  have  the
covid19_flag  set  and  the  proximity_estimation  within  a  certain  range  (say  for  instance  less  than  2  meters  or  less).
Consequently, it is possible to message alert all users that have been within a pre-defined proximity and time exposure of a
specific BLE_id whose smartphone user has declared his/her infection. 
It is therefore evident that smartphones can provide time, location and proximity data that public health authorities
consider valuable, in order to alert the general population [23]. This process forms the very basis of smartphone based
COVID-19 contact tracing and will be used as a reference mechanism for analysis for the rest of this paper. 
The following sections will focus on various implementation details of the reference mechanism. Section 2 will
discuss information security aspects that concern the use of the Bluetooth LE protocol, its data accuracy, as well as its
various information security weaknesses. Section 3 elaborates on the privacy aspects of storing anonymous data in central
infrastructures. The fourth and final section of the paper concludes with concrete recommendations that aim to improve the
security of electronic contact tracing solutions.
2 Bluetooth LE issues and contact tracing 
The Bluetooth protocol is a vast and complex specification [20]. Different versions and smartphone chipset implementations
can result in different operational and information security aspects of its use for the purposes of contact tracing. However, in
broad terms, these aspects touch on three different areas. The first is the area of user privacy. One needs to question what is
the likelihood that a user can be identified as a result of the Bluetooth data exchange necessary to facilitate contact tracing.
A second question relates to how accurate are the data collected by Bluetooth LE for the purposes of contact  tracing.
Finally, a third question to raise is what are the security implications of using it to broadcast your (in theory anonymous)
presence and exchange data with devices you do not know. 
Bluetooth LE allows device manufacturers  to  use  temporary  random addresses  in  over-the-air  communication
instead of their permanent address to prevent tracking, as part of the Bluetooth Core Specification version 4 [24, 25]. Earlier
versions of the Bluetooth Core Specification were broadcasting the interface MAC address, a permanent identifier that is
unique for every smartphone [26] and could thus be used to track an individual. While Bluetooth Core Specification version
4 addresses this issue, it also leaves gaps that could be exploited and lead, under specific circumstances, to identification of
individuals. 
Jameel and Dungen [27] examined Bluetooth LE beacon protocols and an array of mechanisms that facilitate
localized interactions with smartphones and other Bluetooth devices via the beacon mechanisms. The advlib library [28] is a
product  of  their  work  which  allows  software  developers  to  easily  integrate  Bluetooth  LE  beacon  advertising-based
functionality into their applications, without having to embed them into the low-level protocol mechanisms. However, the
practical application of this work for an adversary is that the library could be used to identify Bluetooth powered devices.
While it is not possible to track a specific individual by making use of this mechanism, identifying that someone has a
specific phone and a specific accessory in an area with a limited number of people could aid the process of adversarial
reconnaissance aiming towards personal identification.
Becker,  et al [29] proceed further and demonstrate that even current Bluetooth LE anonymization measures are
vulnerable to passive tracking. Their work proposes an address-carryover algorithm that exploits the asynchronous nature of
the  Bluetooth  LE payload  and achieves  tracking that  bypasses  the  attempted  address  randomization  of  a  device.  The
worrying aspect of their study and experimental setup is that it does not use differential cryptanalysis to decrypt the content
of Bluetooth LE communication. Their method works entirely by intercepting public, unencrypted Bluetooth LE advertising
traffic which is necessary for steps A and B of the abstracted COVID-19 contact tracing procedure outlined in Section 1 of
this paper. It is broad, in the sense that it is effective against all iOS, macOS and Windows 10 devices. 
Another worrying aspect of the work outlined in [29] and also supported by other theoretical and experimental
work [30,31] is that despite the existence of Bluetooth MAC address randomization mechanisms to achieve anonymity, not
all device manufacturers and operating system/application authors choose to employ them in the same way. There is a
certain amount of flexibility in how to implement and transmit these randomized identifiers. These might include standard
ways but different operating systems and applications might embed additional information as part  of the Bluetooth LE
public beacon payloads for the purposes of incorporating customized functionality. This additional information often leaks
vital  identity  aspects  and  is  dictated  by  software,  from  the  operating  system  all  the  way  to  the  application  layer.
Consequently, different COVID-19 contact tracing applications diverge substantially from whatever the relevant Bluetooth
standards dictate and offer different levels of user privacy.
As far as the data accuracy of Bluetooth LE collected data is concerned, there are also serious doubts expressed by
experts. Step C of the abstracted  COVID-19 contact tracing procedure (Section 1 of this paper) attempts to estimate the
distance of an intercepted Bluetooth LE beacon. The question here is with what accuracy can Bluetooth LE determine
whether the user of another smartphone is closer than a predetermined distance (say 2 meters). The best way to answer that
question is to understand the mechanism employed to measure that distance.
The Bluetooth protocol uses the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) to measure distance between devices
[32]. The principle is that the stronger the signal, the closer the devices are to each other, so a correlation between sensed
signal strength and distance can be approximated. However, different bluetooth chipset implementations utilize the RSSI in
slightly different ways. While appropriate calibration can reduce these inaccuracies, the problems do not stop there. The
Bluetooth LE transmission frequency often interferes with other devices in the 2.4 GHz range, such as older WiFi routers,
unshielded  USB  cables  and  microwave  ovens.  A Bluetooth  LE  device  would  do  its  best  to  extend  the  'beacons'
(advertisement of presence and availability) by keeping constant time and regulating the transmission power to overcome
other sources of interference. In such a frequency congested environment, a real distance of 1.5 meters could really be
estimated as 2.5 meters (false negative), or a real distance of 2.5 meters could be  estimated to under 1.5 meters (false
positive).  Many  experts,  amongst  them  the  Bluetooth  inventors  Jaap  Haartsen  and  Sven  Mattisson,  agree  that  these
proximity sensing inaccuracies were and remain a limiting factor [33]. As a result, the accuracy of the collected proximity
data will be reduced and further post processing steps are needed, in order to allow someone to derive safe conclusions
about who is in real danger to get infected due to proximity. 
Finally, an often overlooked aspect of Bluetooth LE is its transmission range. While Bluetooth LE version 4 has a
Line Of Sight (LOS) beacon range of 430 meters, the next major version of the protocol specification (v5) extends that LOS
range to 780 meters [34]. At the time of writing, most mobile phones will be supporting Bluetooth LE version 5 within the
next  12 months.  If  every smarthphone used to  perform many personal  and business critical  things (e-banking,  remote
control of systems at work, email) has yet another interface that advertises the presence of an individual (apart from the 4G/
5G and WiFi interfaces), this provides an advantage for an adversary and can act as a catalyst for cyberattack vectors. The
fact is that bluesnarfing attacks against mobile phones have been identified from the early adoption days of the bluetooth
protocol [35]. Moreover, there is good evidence that these attacks have persisted over a number of years [36] and will
continue  to  persist  with  many  recent  notable  examples  that  target  bluetooth  device  firmware  features  [37,  38].  The
conclusion derived by this body of work is that the COVID-19 contact tracing applications increase the exploitable attack
footprint of the average smartphone. 
3 Privacy and security aspects of storing and processing contact tracing data 
The COVID-19 contact tracing data collected by smartphones always require some data entry processing backend (central
server or servers that operate independently). However, there are different degrees of data centralization among the various
solutions. For instance, the Norwegian [6] and Singaporean [7] contact tracing implementation are some of the paradigms
that require all collected data to be centralized for further processing. In direct contrast, the Temporary Contact Numbers
(TCN)  protocol [39] as well as the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) protocol [40] constitute
examples of protocols that are designed to minimize both the amount of info as well as the necessary processing in a
centralized infrastructure. Google and Apple seem to follow the decentralized approach [9]. 
Prior discussing the relative merits of centralized versus decentralized COVID-19 contact tracing approaches and
beyond the Bluetooth LE related privacy threats discussed in Section 2, it is useful to examine the context of what user
privacy means when combined with a justified need to enhance the tools that health authorities can utilize to effectively
contain the spread of a pandemic.
The European Union is among the major global players that have officially recognized the potential of smartphone
and associated technological solutions to fight the COVID-19 pandemic [41]. Part of this recognition is made amidst the
presence of comprehensive regulations such as GDPR [42] that set very strict requirements for the storage and processing of
personal information. Many countries have modified their national data protection laws to make urgent allowances for the
data collection and processing of personal data related to the  COVID-19 pandemic [43]. As an example, the Norwegian
National Data Protection Authority (Datatilsynet) has explicitly permitted non anonymous location data processing for the
purposes of  COVID-19 smartphone contact tracing, only if it is not possible to derive safe conclusions from anonymous
proximity based data [44]. These steps indicate that there is a need for balance between personal privacy and public health
[45].             
It is outside the scope of this paper to pass a judgement on whether amendments to national legislations should
favor privacy over public health or vice versa. The goal of this review is to highlight what is in favor of the privacy of the
smartphone user and thus help specialists and policy makers to implement electronic contact tracing in the least privacy
intrusive manner.  Achieving  such a goal  is  not  always  trivial  and  it  will  require adherence  to  international  standards.
Validated international standards for smartphone based contact tracing do not exist at the time of writing. What does exist is
a set of EU recommendations [46] that dictate a set of principles relevant to user privacy in the context of electronic contact
tracing. In particular, the EU recommendations dictate that all smartphone based contact tracing solutions should:
A)Operate on anonymized data with the goal of alerting users that have been in close proximity to confirmed cases
without revealing the identity of the index case or the contacts. Breach of anonymity and hence disclosure of the identity
details of an individual 
B) Not track the location of the users.
C)  Be based  on  voluntary  user  participation.  Any  unauthorized  usage  of  data  without  the  knowledge  or  the
approval of the user is strictly prohibited.
D)The entire infrastructure should be secure and effective end to end. This includes any centralized components
where data are deposited for processing.
E) There need to be interoperable and scalable across a number of countries, as people travel from country to
country.
Having these requirements as a guide, one of the first conclusions we can derive is that any solution that stores,
sends and processes GPS and A-GPS data is not acceptable from a privacy perspective. A time series of GPS coordinates or
other network assisted location data (cell tower ID) is personal information and whether deposited partly or completely in a
central database server reveals too much information for a user. Research efforts that propose privacy preserving location
based contact  tracing exist.  MIT researchers  have  proposed a  contact  tracing system based  on a method that  redacts,
transforms and encrypts GPS coordinates to address the privacy preservation problem [47]. The contact tracing is then
computed  by  a  process  known as  Private  Set  Intersection  (PSI),  a  technique  commonly  employed  as  part  of  secure
multiparty computing [48], aiming to reveal only the common data values that are necessary for the computation. 
However,  privacy  preserving  contact  tracing  techniques  that  use  GPS  coordinates  constitute  best  effort
experimental approaches that need a reference implementation to be tested and proven. An additional practical matter is that
of accuracy. GPS and A-GPS coordinates cannot at the moment provide a level of accuracy in terms of contact proximity
and this is why most solutions today resort to the use of Bluetooth LE, even with the problems discussed in Section 2 of this
paper. A last practical aspect concerns compliance to existing legislation. If the law does not provide a clear framework for
the sampling of  location data for  health  related purposes,  then it  is  not  possible to  employ these techniques and thus
approaches that rely on geolocating the users will be impractical and impossible to implement. 
Researchers that are proponents of techniques that employ GPS coordinates [47] point out that large companies
already collect user location data for operational and advertisement purposes. While this is true [18,19], there is a distinct
difference between geolocating individuals for commercial purposes and doing the same in a health context. Apart from the
location info this kind of contact tracing solutions contain references to health status (infected or not infected status of an
individual). Combining personal location info to health status raises the legal context and regulatory handling requirements
of the collected/processed information. For instance, the European Data Protection Supervisor considers all data concerning
health as a special category [49,50] for which strict privacy preserving requirements apply when it comes to the handling
and processing of the collected information.
The concentration of large amounts of (theoretically) anonymous health related information in central repositories
for the purposes of centralized contact tracing solutions [6,7] creates certain risks and operational requirements for the
storage and processing of the data. Weaknesses in the anonymity protocols (such as the ones described in Section 2 of this
paper in connection to the Bluetooth LE protocol) or in the implementation of infrastructures could place a malicious
adversary in a situation to collect information that could compromise the privacy of millions of individuals. The handling of
large amounts of anonymous (or desensitized) health data predates the electronic contact tracing era and can be observed in
other fields of health informatics. A good example is that of genomic medicine where certain types of genomic data, even if
they have been anonymised in principle, they do provide distinct probable ways to re-identify the subjects of a study [51].
For these reasons, access to these types of data requires data consumers to follow certain ethical guidelines that bind them
not  to  use them in ways  that  could re-identify  the anonymised study subjects  and  conform to strict  storage and data
processing requirements [52]. 
On the other hand, centralized processing requirements are simpler to implement in principle when compared to
decentralized contact tracing solutions such as those proposed in [39] and [40]. In general terms, the aim of decentralized
contract tracing solutions is to reduce the privacy and security impact of having all the necessary data in one place. They
still require a minimal centralized component, especially for steps that incorporate the health status (infected or not infected
contact), however the disclosure of information to central entities is minimal by design.  This reduces the possibility for
abuse of central data repositories. On the other hand, decentralized solutions delegate the processing of info to non trusted
devices (the smartphones of the users). This increases implementation complexity. The entire concept has not been yet
proven at scale, both in theory and practice.  Most existing contact tracing solutions follow the centralized storage and
information processing model at the time of writing. 
A final  consideration  has  to  do  with  how  the  central  IT  infrastructure  for  contract  tracing  solutions  are
implemented.  There  seems to be certain lack  of  transparency on how this  central  part  has  been  implemented.  Taking
Norway as an example, a country with good tradition on respecting the privacy of its citizens and among the first to launch a
COVID-19 contact tracing application, it is evident that no tender processes have been disclosed for awarding public funds
to construct the application [53], calls to open source the application in order to aid the review by security experts were
denied [54] and that data that contain GPS, Bluetooth LE smartphone identifiers and health status were stored in private
cloud vendors [55] with unclear status on whether the data can leave the Norwegian geographic border.    As a result, the
Norwegian implementation drew a lot of criticism by many IT experts around the world [56]. This is by no means unique to
Norway. Other countries have faced similar criticism. 
Transparency of data processing, as well as export control of health data are issues that should be taken seriously as
dictated  by  pan  European  (GDPR)  and  other  international  legislation  [57].  Besides  compliance,  choices  that  limit
transparency  make  public  acceptance  of  a  technology  difficult.  Thus,  it  is  evident  that  implementing  contact  tracing
technology  should  be  a  process  with  structure  and  best  practices  that  are  missing  at  the  moment.  This  structure  and
recommended practices forms the subject of the next section of this paper.
4 Conclusions and recommendations for implementing electronic contact tracing solutions   
The previous sections of this paper have highlighted that the existing COVID-19 contact tracing applications have serious
problems, both in terms of the reliability of the collected data sets, as well as in terms of preserving the end user privacy and
security.  Addressing these problems is not a trivial  process  and will  require substantial  efforts towards the creation of
standards that oversee the development of contact  tracing platforms. The existing EU recommendations [46] that  were
discussed in Section 3 of this paper can serve as a good start on a road map that will make electronic contact tracing both
usable and acceptable by societies around the world. 
On  the  issues  of  Bluetooth  LE  accuracy  discussed  in  Section  2  [33],  there  are  research  and  development
approaches aiming to increase the proximity sensing accuracy of the protocol. Examples of such work can be found in [58-
59]. It is also possible that smartphone chipset manufacturers together with future versions of the Bluetooth LE protocol will
add  features  that  will  increase  the  proximity  sensing  accuracy.  However,  no  matter  what  technological  measures  are
employed to achieve additional proximity sensing precision, the important thing is to put them to the test in a standard
manner. The only reliable way to do this is to set control experiments where a group of individuals using smartphones can
create verified/predetermined contacts  under  a  variety of  conditions (inside buildings with different  level  of  RF noise
environments different contact times and different number of individuals). If the subsequent analysis of the recorded data
accurately represents the verified/predetermined conditions within a predetermined statistical accuracy (say less than 1% for
both false positives or negatives) then this means that the data collected by a contact tracing implementation is good enough
to be used for the public. Launching an application on a national scale without proving the accuracy of the sampled data and
verifying it by statisticians and experts can lead to misleading results and should be avoided. 
When  it  comes  to  the  rest  of  the  vulnerabilities  of  the  Bluetooth  LE  protocol  (range  on  LOS and  software
vulnerabilities discussed in Section 2 and referenced in [34-38]), there are various measures to be taken. It is prudent that
the Bluetooth LE power is regulated in a standardized manner when operating a contact tracing application, so that the
effective range of the protocol is reduced. Setting devices to the lowest power level to perform reliably proximity sensing
will reduce the effective adversarial surveillance range [60]. In addition, smartphone manufacturers need to do a better job
in addressing the firmware and mobile operating system vulnerabilities, especially for the older smartphone devices. As an
example, in the Android mobile operating system, critical Bluetooth vulnerabilities such as the ‘BlueFrag’ CVE-2020-0022
[61] affected mainly older versions of the Android system for several months. While the vulnerability in question has been
patched at  the  time of  writing,  not  all  Android device  manufacturers  have  included this  patch in  their  Android OEM
versions. The result is that a substantial number of smartphone users that still operate Android version 8 are vulnerable if
they use contact tracing and other Bluetooth based data exchange applications. Thus, it is our view that world wide or
regional  regulations  should make mandatory  that  all  smartphone vendors  issue  critical  system updates  throughout  the
expected life cycle of a smartphone (3-5 years). 
Drawing upon the EU contact  tracing implementation requirements  [46],  we advise against  the  usage  of  any
location data (GPS, A-GPS, cell tower ID or other) in electronic contact tracing solutions. Apart from conflicts with data
protection legislation discussed in Section 3 [49, 50], we do not see how location data can enhance the contact discovery.
For the purposes of contact tracing, the Bluetooth LE proximity collected data are more relevant and accurate than any other
form of satellite  or  network assisted location system. Incorporating location data,  even  when anonymised/desensitized
increases the susceptibility of the collected data to differential privacy attacks [62], especially in implementations where the
data is centralized and should be avoided. 
We do not have enough data on existing implementations to recommend whether existing decentralized approaches
should be favored over centralized approaches. As discussed in Section 3 of this paper there are certain advantages and
disadvantages for each of these approaches. Decentralized approaches follow the principle of minimizing the amount of
information necessary to perform the contact tracing, however they add implementation complexity and require information
to be distributed to untrusted entities. While decentralized approaches look promising, they require further theoretical and
practical implementation validation by experts, before definite conclusions are drawn. However, as both approaches require
some main IT infrastructure component beyond the information gathered by smartphones, the following paragraphs discuss
some concrete recommendations that can aid the security of electronic contact tracing solutions.  
Section 3 discussed the paradigm of genomic medicine data [51] and its  analogy to that  of electronic contact
tracing  solutions.  The  common denominator  is  the  presence  of  a  large  amount  of  anonymized  health  data.  Whatever
cryptographic precautions can be taken to protect the identity of the contact tracing users, this does not change the fact that a
large amount of information about public health is stored in one form or another (centralized versus decentralized, different
encryption standards). In our view, this should be good enough to treat this kind of anonymous data in the same way as
eponymous medical  data.  This view is supported by existing data classification policies that  form part  of Information
Security Management practices [63]. As an example, the University of Oslo, the largest and oldest academic institution in
Norway, manages large amounts of electronic information, including sensitive eponymous data from the Oslo University
Hospital. For that reason, its information security management system [64] classifies large amounts of anonymous health
data at  the highest  level  of data sensitivity [65].  This has several implications about how anonymised contract  tracing
information should be stored and processed.
Infrastructures that hold eponymous sensitive medical data and have approval by relevant national data protection
authorities implement a lot of technical  requirements to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
sensitive data is safeguarded. Drawing from the University of Oslo’s paradigm, its ‘Services for Sensitive Data (TSD)’
platform [66] is a practical implementation that provides these safeguards. Elements such as multi-factor authentication
[67], compartmentalization of computation activities on security hardened virtual machines and storage/backup encryption
are some of the techniques employed by TSD. In our view, these should be mandatory technical elements that should form a
standard for every core IT infrastructure platform that handles electronic contact tracing data at national/international level.
In addition, core IT infrastructures should comply to GDPR [42] and possibly the HIPAA standard [68]. Compliance to
these standards can also aid the interoperability among different national  contact  tracing solutions across a  number of
countries and continents. EU requirements dictate that contact tracing solutions should be interoperable [46]. 
Finally,  as the use of  cloud computing is  increasing and the pressure for  healthcare systems to be more cost
effective is growing [69], there are certain risks associated to placing public health data in the cloud. A principal risk is that
many large private cloud providers offer a utility service without safeguarding (or even wanting to know) the criticality and
importance of the data and the tasks performed in their infrastructure [70]. When private cloud providers are used for core
IT contact tracing infrastructure, we recommend three concrete rules. The first is that private cloud providers should comply
to the same technical  requirements and regulations set  of the previous paragraph. In addition and as a consequence of
regulatory compliance, private cloud providers should provide IT infrastructures within the geographical territory of the
country/region if laws dictate the data should be localized. A third recommendation is that an independent cost-risk analysis
should be commissioned prior reaching decisions to store and process contact tracing data exclusively in private cloud
providers. A better approach is to adopt hybrid cloud technologies, where a public authority can have the option of easily
turning the data and compute activities back to their own infrastructure, in case they face legislation or data availability
problems.
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